Unless there is a breakthrough in the next couple of days, the ongoing negotiations at Cancun are not expected to yield significant progress on tackling the global climate challenge. By now, we have settled into a familiar pattern, which is a stand-off between industrialized countries (termed as Annex-I) and developing countries (non-Annex-I).

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change requires all countries to work together to tackle the climate challenge but industrialized countries to take the lead and also to provide finance and technology to help non-Annex-I with mitigation and adaptation. The first binding agreement to reduce emissions – the Kyoto Protocol – floundered almost immediately because of the insistence of the US that it would not participate unless developing countries did so. This view has slowly permeated much of the Annex-I grouping. But developing countries are understandably reluctant to take on binding emission reduction targets before Annex-I countries have demonstrated significant reductions themselves and have offered appropriate financial and technical support.

To understand the situation better, we have to look at the past, present, and future of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions landscape. The majority of the historical responsibility of accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere lies with the Annex-I countries – for example, estimates from theWorld Resources Institute indicate that 70% of the historical concentration increase in carbon dioxide (CO2, the main GHG) from energy sources is from Annex-I countries. These countries also have the greatest financial and technical resources – their average per capita gross domestic product is almost $30,000, while that of non-Annex-I countries is less than $5000. Non-Annex-I countries, with 80% of the world's population, currently emit about 50% of the world's CO2 (a bit more, if you include deforestation). But looking into the future, much of the increase in the global energy demand and GHG emissions will come from these countries. And it is this future growth that is presented as the rationale for Annex-I insistence on developing country participation in a mitigation regime.

A major issue in the climate negotiations has been the unrelenting hard-line stance of the US, both in its refusal to take on strong emissions cuts and its insistence on major developing countries taking on significant targets. The US is seen as a critical player since it is world's largest economy and the second-largest GHG polluter. This has shaped the dynamics of the negotiations, with much effort being focused on how to bring the US into a mitigation regime. But by according such primacy to the US, the rest of the world, in effect, has ceded power to it in the negotiations.

This in turn has led to a dilution of the aims and outcomes of the negotiations — it is widely agreed that the pledges under the Copenhagen Accord are utterly inadequate in keeping global temperature rise below 2 degree centigrade, which is seen as necessary to avoid dangerous climate change.

If the US is not ready to come on board the kind of a mitigation regime that is needed to meet the temperature target, then maybe the rest of the world should think of moving ahead on its own. In any case, over time, the role of the US will diminish – the IEA estimates that by 2030, the US portion of the global CO2 emissions will be about 13% (down from the 19% currently). The technical prowess of the US can still contribute – most of the growth in global energy demand will be in developing countries (as much as 90% in non-OECD countries, according to the IEA) and US firms are sure to want a piece of these markets. The US can then come on board when it is willing and ready to do so. And in the meanwhile the rest of the world can get on with the task of avoiding dangerous climate change. Difficult challenges require 'out of the box' thinking and it is time we did so in the climate negotiations.